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 Building on the legacy of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto and the success of the Pugwash 
Movement, this paper reflects on the nature of contemporary threats to human security and its 
implications to the agenda of Pugwash. On the basis of recent conceptual developments in 
the field of conflict studies and significant changes in current policy practice in the field of 
‘peace & conflict’, this article puts the risks emanating from armament and especially 
weapons of mass destruction into a larger framework of human security and human 
development. It argues that contemporary security and conflict analysis especially tends to 
emphasize the importance of non-military factors and processes in causing and escalating 
lethal conflict. The article explores the implications of these observations for the Pugwash 
agenda and how to do justice to the fundamental questions arising from these recent 
developments in the framework of Pugwash’s agenda and interests.    
  
The end of superpower rivalry and the emergence of a different type of conflict  
In peace and conflict studies the earlier emphasis on military aspects and ‘classical’ war studies 
seems to have dwindled and a more comprehensive and interdisciplinary approach to conflict 
studies has emerged in academic and policy circles in response to current crises. This 
development had partly to do with the end of the Cold-War epoch and the resultant changes in 
perceptions. During the Cold War the focus had been nearly exclusively on the contradictions 
and (military) power balances between the two superpowers and on the proxy wars they 
fought. The risk of nuclear escalation of superpower rivalry lay at the basis of the Russell-
Einstein Manifesto and the establishment of the Pugwash Movement. The destructive power 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had grown to such proportions 
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that the very survival of mankind was deemed at stake, once those weapons were deployed in 
war situations. 
Paradoxically, the prevalence of those weapons and the risks involved in their use also led 
to what was termed ‘mutual deterrence’. Similarly, ‘Third World conflicts’ used to be contained 
to ‘manageable’ levels, particularly to avoid ‘spill-over’ and escalatory effects eventually leading 
to superpower nuclear confrontation. However, after the end of the Cold war this worldwide 
‘brake’ on local conflicts disappeared and the so-called ‘decompression effect’ occurred, 
seemingly leading to a multiplication of local and regional conflicts in the early nineties, even 
though many of them had older roots. Modern media showed the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of those wars, adding urgency to the need to manage and resolve these conflicts. 
Consequently, the political, military, humanitarian and academic attention turned to a type of 
conflict that seemed to be characterised by other causes, motives, actors and strategies than the 
wars associated with an earlier period that had inspired the establishment of the Pugwash 
Movement.   
The new face of war   
It is a challenge to define contemporary conflict. If we compare conflict today with conflict in 
the past, we must admit that not every individual feature of today’s conflict is new. However, 
most present-day conflicts show a different constellation of conflict factors than earlier ones. 
Some academics therefore have labelled them as ‘New Wars’ compared to ‘Old Wars’ [1]. 
Others have used the notion of ‘complex political emergencies’, stating that ‘contemporary 
conflicts are not merely complex, but they are ... messes. They are not specific problems with 
identifiable causes that can be fully understood and for which ‘solutions’ can be generated. At 
best, understanding will always be partial, contingencies will play havoc with linear notions of 
cause and effect and predictability will be at low levels’ [2]. Again others use notions like ‘non-
state trans-boundary conflict’, ‘post-modern conflict’, ‘ethnic conflict’ or ‘intrastate conflict’ to 
describe and analyse these conflicts.   
None of these notions may, however, completely encapsulate the complex nature and 
distinctive features of present-day conflicts, underlining the need to describe them more fully 
in their time- and place-specific contexts. In this connection, there has been a plea to adopt an 
ethnographic approach to study those conflicts [3]. Obviously, there is a large diversity in the 
type, scale and cultures of contemporary conflicts. Even though they tend to share some 
general features, there are many competing conceptual and theoretical approaches as to their 
explanation. In the framework of this paper I cannot do justice to the extremely vibrant and 
varied debates on the nature of current conflict, but shall briefly discuss some important issues 
reflecting present views in the literature.  
The regional and international dimension of intrastate conflict  
The author Holsti states that not the relations between states, but the characteristics of the 
state itself have to be seen as underlying current conflicts [4]. This denotes the fact that the 
causes of these wars are basically of an internal nature. In this article I therefore refer to 
contemporary conflict as intrastate conflict. However, I recognise the limitations of this 
notion. It does, for example, not imply that there is no ‘foreign’ involvement in these conflicts. 
On the contrary, neighbouring countries, the United Nations, international organisations, 
international NGOs, foreign corporate firms, mercenaries, traders, trans-boundary criminal 
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networks etc. are all involved in the pursuit of war or peace in those countries. Another 
important factor in this connection is the role of the diaspora, which has contributed to the 
spread, ‘de-localisation’ and ‘de-terrorialisation’ of conflict [5]. In this connection, the word 
intrastate refers basically to the genesis of the conflict, but not so much to its other 
characteristics.  
The causes of intrastate conflict  
Regarding the causes of conflict, some authors focus on the lack of nation-building or state 
formation, while others tend to promote neo-malthusian explanations about resource scarcity 
and population pressure. Some do believe that ‘poverty breeds conflict’. Others talk about 
‘identity politics’ and even ‘ancient hatreds’. Recently, more attention has been paid to the role 
of ‘discourses of violence’ in the legitimisation and violent escalation of conflict. In order to 
explain intrastate conflict we need to take a broad range of factors into consideration on the 
basis of a trans-disciplinary approach and an eclectic theoretical framework that is constantly 
confronted with empirical reality. The following remarks reflect some ideas that are generally 
subscribed to in discussing intrastate conflict.  
Intrastate conflicts are usually caused by a complex of factors built up over a long history 
of tension. Most conflicts seem to have a fundamentally political aspect, as they are fought over 
power and scarce resources. Simultaneously, they are expressions of existing social, political, 
economic and cultural structures and cleavages [6]. They tend to occur in societies where state 
legitimacy and popular representation are low, or states are failing. Particular identity groups 
are excluded from power and political participation. They feel discriminated against. This is 
compounded by a lopsided distribution of goods and services, where their access to scarce 
resources is limited or altogether denied by the state. In addition, the religious or cultural 
identity of these groups is often suppressed. In this way grievances build up over time. Initial 
demands and peaceful protests are frequently oppressed violently and thus the situation 
gradually escalates into violent conflict. In contrast to interstate conflicts, it is the polity and 
society itself that make conditions conflict-prone. Deprived groups may be easily mobilised 
into violence by conflict entrepreneurs and political opportunists.   
Case-studies confirm the importance of political factors in causing conflict and show also 
that a high incidence of poverty or inequality does not cause conflict directly, but tend to 
perpetuate and aggravate conflict. This is especially the case, when poverty and inequality are 
perceived from a perspective of relative deprivation and come to be seen as a consequence of 
conscious discriminatory government policy. Similarly, external involvement is not a prime 
cause of conflict, but tends to prolong and intensify the conflict [7]. The same applies to 
availability of arms that per se are not a root cause of conflict, but rather function as an 
aggravating factor at most.   
The role of economic factors in present wars is still subject to considerable debate. The 
emergence of ‘economies of violence’ that thrive on and feed into those wars has led to a 
growing emphasis on economic explanations of contemporary conflict as exemplified in the 
‘greed and grievance’ debate [8]. Collier states that contemporary conflicts can better be 
explained by the economic ‘feasibility of predation’ than by grievances. He says that rebel 
movements need a ‘discourse of grievance’ or a ‘language of protest’ for their national and 
international relations, but that these grievances are not the real ‘objective’ causes of conflict 
54 ISYP Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2006  
 
 
 
[9]. It is now increasingly argued, however, that an approach acknowledging the relevance of 
both greed and grievance would greatly benefit a more comprehensive understanding of 
contemporary internal conflicts. While social and cultural grievances provide underlying 
motives for group mobilisation into violence, economic motives do play a role when the war 
has gained momentum and a scramble for personal gain erupts under armed factions and 
warlords [10]. It has also been suggested that leaders and followers may be motivated by 
different sets of factors and that these motives also may change during the course of the 
conflict.  
In conclusion, it can be stated that intrastate conflicts are historical, dynamic and multi- 
dimensional phenomena that have multiple causes and consequences. The relative importance 
of military aspects or arms in the explanation of Cold War rivalry has given way to an emphasis 
on historical, political, economic and social factors in contemporary approaches to intrastate 
conflict. This also means that the present challenges are more complex and diffuse, less 
predictable and probably also less amenable to remedial action.  
Changing war, changing peace: the need for different approaches  
The conduct of intrastate wars shows considerable differences from the classic interstate wars 
that dominated Cold-War perceptions. Fighting in intrastate conflict takes place between 
variegated parties and temporary alliances, made up by state and non-state actors. It often 
becomes hard to discern who are combatants and who are non-combatants. Usually, the civil 
population is directly targeted by the perpetrators of violence and accounts for 90% of all 
victims, most of them being women and children. In addition, civil society is subject to 
widespread displacement combined with large-scale and deliberate destruction of houses and 
other property. Women often bear the brunt of this violence, as they are usually left behind 
unprotected by their male relatives taking part in the fighting. They are also less mobile, as they 
have to take care of young children or old and ill family members. Therefore, they are often 
unable to flee the onset of violence.   
Other characteristics of intrastate conflict are that international conventions and rules for 
warfare are disobeyed. Many methods directed against the civil population are prohibited under 
war law and international humanitarian law, and include systematic rape, ethnic cleansing and 
starvation. Women are targeted specifically as they are considered to be symbols of culture and 
identity. Attacks on them intend to demoralise and to ‘pollute’ the whole community. Violence 
is not bound to the battlefield, but is widespread and fragmented. Hit-and-run attacks are 
combined with urban warfare, and guerrilla and counter-insurgency strategies. Intrastate 
conflicts tend to be protracted, but may show periods of relative calm interspersed with 
episodes of intensive fighting. Zones of peace alternate with zones of war. Use is made of light 
weaponry and ‘small arms’ and even of agricultural implements and knives. The technological 
aspect of those new wars is relatively less salient and sophisticated, and most arms are relatively 
inexpensive compared to conventional warfare.   
These characteristics of warfare necessitate other approaches to conflict prevention, 
conflict management, peace building and reconciliation and – for that matter – arms control. 
The conventional concepts and methods of peacemaking through diplomacy, ‘high politics’ 
and negotiations exclusively between government bodies no longer suffice. In this regard, 
Hilhorst and Frerks ask: ‘How to negotiate when it is not even clear whom to invite to the 
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negotiation table? How to apply diplomacy if leaders have no clue or couldn’t care less about 
the Geneva Conventions? How to call a cease-fire if there are not even armies? How to 
organise disarmament when much of the weaponry consists of everyday tools? And how to 
isolate combatants when they involve much of the civil population?’ [11] They argue that 
‘warfare’ calls for ‘changing peacefare’. This reasoning obviously also affects efforts in 
disarmament and arms control that mainly concern interstate relations.  
Peace and security revisited  
Current conflicts therefore necessitate a new notion of peace and security. The dichotomy 
between peace and conflict seems to hold no longer. Currently, most societies in conflict show 
a hybrid nature and are characterised by a bizarre combination of both peace and war. The 
then Dutch development minister Jan Pronk stated: ‘... ever more countries linger in prolonged 
states of half peace/half war. The nature of present intrastate conflicts makes it increasingly 
difficult to determine when and where violence ends and peace starts. .... This is also true the 
other way round: in many societies we are not certain when and where peace ends, and 
violence starts’ [12]. Johan Galtung has introduced the distinction between ‘negative peace’ and 
‘positive peace’. Whereas the former only denotes the absence of violence (weaponry), the 
latter implies a movement toward a more egalitarian and just society, where the root causes of 
conflict are being addressed.  
Not only the notion of peace is subject to change, but also the concept of security. Instead 
of using the concept of military security, academics and policymakers in the field of intrastate 
conflict nowadays often use the notions of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘human security’, which 
transcend a purely military approach to war and peace. Human security has been defined by 
the UNDP in its Human Development Report: ‘For most people today a feeling of insecurity 
arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job 
security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these 
are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world.’ The introduction of this 
concept has led to a shift from security through armament to security through sustainable 
human development and one that transcends the usual emphasis on territory [13].  
It nowadays is acknowledged that security is a public good like other goods, such as 
education or health. The provision of such human security is obviously not anymore the 
exclusive domain of policy makers, diplomats and military specialists, but has opened up the 
possibility for development, relief and peace-building agencies to contribute to security and 
peace. In policy circles there is at present a plea to formulate integrated, multi-actor responses 
to the comprehensive security challenges faced, combining the efforts of the Departments of 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Development Cooperation, Environment and Trade. Such a 
comprehensive understanding of security has now become widely accepted, as evidenced in 
recent publications such as A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility by the UN High Level 
Panel [14], State of the World 2005: Redefining Global Security by the Worldwatch Institute [15], or 
the European Security Strategy formulated by the European Union.   
Also in Pugwash, this comprehensive type of analysis has been emerging. At the 54th 
Pugwash Conference in Seoul (2004), Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino stated: ‘We in 
Pugwash started as a small community made up almost exclusively of scientists who wanted to 
promote dialogue and mutual understanding and point out the risks associated with the 
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presence of nuclear weapons and other WMD. As you can see from our activities and 
participation, many of us are still scientists concerned with our responsibility and with the 
possible consequences of developments in Science and Technology. It is not only weapons, 
which matter when we are talking about human security. Other non-military aspects (unequal 
economic development, the spread of specific diseases, the environment) can have a dramatic 
impact on our security and ultimately provide sources of conflict. There is certainly space now 
and in the future in Pugwash for these problems.’  
The High Level Panel report mentions crime, poverty, infectious disease and 
environmental degradation as serious security threats apart from interstate and intrastate 
conflict, terrorism and nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons. The Worldwatch 
Institute Report talks about ‘problems without passports’, such as endemic poverty, growing 
inequality and unemployment, international crime, population movements, recurring natural 
disasters, ecosystem breakdown, new and resurgent communicable diseases. It also emphasises 
that a military approach to the problems alone is inadequate and probably counterproductive. 
Individual (donor) countries, like, for example, The Netherlands and the UK, have adopted 
similar comprehensive perspectives to deal with conflicts in their foreign and aid policies.  
This implies that economic and development aid policies are now focusing explicitly on 
the issue of conflict and are mobilised to contribute to conflict resolution and peace-building. 
This has led to significant changes in those policies. They have become ‘conflict-sensitised’ [16] 
and must now work ‘on conflict’. In a publication on donor practice in conflict situations, 
Jonathan Goodhand introduced this notion implying that development programmes can 
exploit opportunities to positively affect the dynamics of conflict. Instead of continuing 
‘business as usual’ or ‘working around conflict’, development co-operation should explicitly 
refocus its programs to address the root causes of the conflict, e.g. governance, poverty 
alleviation, social exclusion. In addition, they should continue to work on incentives for peace 
and disincentives for violence, and promote conflict mediation and protection of human rights.  
Implications for Pugwash  
The Russell-Einstein Manifesto and Pugwash’s advocacy with regard the elimination of nuclear 
weapons and the attendant initiatives in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament 
continue to be of utmost relevance today. Yet, the changing nature of contemporary conflicts 
and the emergence of ‘new security challenges’ as compared to conventional warfare, have 
added new concerns to the global agenda and perhaps also changed the order of priorities. The 
last decades Pugwash has in fact started to explore the challenges emanating from this current, 
comprehensive security problematique.   
The Dagomys declaration of 1988 already stated ‘Without reducing our commitment to 
arms reduction and war prevention, we must recognise that environmental degradation and 
large-scale impoverishment are already facts and can lead to a massive catastrophe even if 
nuclear war is avoided. ....  These linked environmental problems affect all nations. They 
exacerbate international tensions and increase the risk of future conflicts’.    
The Goals of Pugwash in its Tenth Quinquennium (2002-2007), include: ‘working to 
transform and reverse the conditions of economic deprivation, environmental deterioration, 
and resource scarcity and unequal access that are deplorable in themselves and give rise to 
despair, resentment, hostility, and violence around the world. Pugwash will continue to address 
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this broad web of inter-related dangers, and to work for the sustainable use of energy and 
natural resources and the constraint of anthropogenic disruption of climate.’  
Pugwash has gained considerable experience in those domains from a diversity of 
Pugwash workshops that addressed themes such as ‘Human Security in the Southern African 
Context’, ‘Intervention and Sovereignty’, ‘Public Health Systems in Developing Countries’, 
‘The Impact of Agricultural Biotechnology on Environmental and Food Security’, ‘Methods 
for Implementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change’, ‘Sharing the Planet: 
Population - Consumption - Species’, ‘The Security Aspects of HIV/AIDS’, ‘Economic and 
Social Inequities in Latin America’, and a number of workshops addressing regional conflicts 
(in South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East).   
Obviously, more efforts are indicated before we can fully conceptualise these 
contemporary challenges and deal with them. A number of issues are still to a certain degree 
contested, but on the other hand developments are moving rapidly, also in terms of emerging, 
evidence-based insights.  
Extending the line of thinking that Pugwash has already developed in the past decades, 
Pugwash should systematically include these contemporary challenges in its regular agenda. In 
particular, the conceptualisation of such challenges within a larger framework of Human 
Security and the criteria for attaining a clear action-oriented focus need further debate. In this 
connection, Pugwash’s former Secretary General, George Rathjens, emphasised at the 52nd 
Pugwash Conference in La Jolla (2002) that ‘Pugwash should focus on problems of 
importance, and, in general, since it is an international organisation, on those of direct concern 
to more than one country …. It should concentrate its efforts in areas where it has 
comparative advantage over other like-minded organisations …. [And it] must concentrate its 
efforts generally on what I will call knife-edge problems: on decisions where the forces on the 
two sides of an argument are close to being in balance: problems where possible Pugwash 
involvement might be instrumental in pushing the decision one way or the other – and on a 
time-scale measured in months or years; not one measured in decades.’  
Many of the issues discussed above require the same intellectual and moral resolve and 
effort as the nuclear threat nearly fifty years ago. At the same time we recognise that the 
multiplex and diffuse nature of the current security challenges make them less easy to address 
and it may also be more difficult to mobilise the same public response or indignation. We also 
move from the relatively clear-cut domain of armament and hard science to the more 
complicated and arguably less tangible domain of politics, economics and social science. Yet, 
Pugwash members cannot ignore these challenges and should relate to these issues as they 
present themselves here and now.  
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